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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
by the instant case will arise under the Uniform Commercial Code
in the area of retaken consumer goods. Sec. 19 of the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act provides for resale within thirty days, "After
the seller has retaken possession." Sec. 9-505 (1) of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code provides for liability for failure to dispose of the goods
within ninety days, "After he takes possession." Unless the word pos-
session in the latter phrase be interpreted to mean judicial as well as
peaceful possession, it would appear that the Uniform Commercial
Code has not completely eliminated the problem of resale after retaking
by legal process.
Wisconsin has not passed on the precise issue presented by the in-
stant case, however Wisconsin has adopted the language of the Model
Uniform Conditional Sales Act Sec. 19.19 In considering amendment
of the Wisconsin Statute,20 it is suggested that the Indiana version be
adopted. By not requiring an answer to be interposed, it apparently
eliminates a troublesome area present in the New York amendment.
Under the New York version, it appears incumbent on the conditional
vendor to proceed to conduct the resale as soon as the goods are de-
livered to him by the sheriff, for it is likely that unless he do so, he
will fail to resell within the thirty day period should the vendee refuse
to contest the action.21 Construction of the Indiana provision, on the
other hand, would quite probably allow the vendor thirty days after
entry of judgment in which to conduct the resale, regardless of wheth-
er such judgment be obtained on the merits or by default.
ROBERT CHOINSKI
Pleading: Adding Parties by Intervention - Plaintiff, a New
York corporation engaged in the business of buying dairy products
for purposes of manufacture, brought an action against the attorney
general and other state officers for a judgment that a Wisconsin
Statute1 be declared unconstitutional. The Pure Milk Products Co-
operative petitioned for intervention on the ground that, by the terms
of its marketing agreement with its producing members, it was their
collective agent authorized to represent them in selling milk to pur-
19"If the buyer does not redeem the goods within ten days after the seller
has retaken possession, and the buyer has paid at least fifty per cent of the
purchase price at the time of the retaking, the seller shall sell them at public
auction in the state where they were at the time of the retaking, such sale
to be held not more than thirty days after the retaking ..
20 WIs. STATS. §122.19 (1955).
21 This same obj ecion was presented in the merchants association brief, see note
10 supra.
iVxs. STATS. §100.22 (1955): "One engaged in buying milk, cream, or butter-
fat for the purpose of manufacture, who pays a higher rate for such products
in one section of the state than in another, shall be guilty of unfair discrim-




chaser plants, including plaintiff's, and that therefore it was interested
in the pending action and in the subject matter thereof. The claim
of right to intervene was based upon that portion of Wisconsin Stat-
ute, sec. 260.19 which provides that: "When ... persons not parties
have such interests in the subject matter of the controversy as require
them to be parties for their protection, the court shall order them
brought in. .... 2 Trial court denied the application. Held: that ap-
plication was properly denied. Petitioner was not a necessary party
to the action. In the absence o-f allegation that the attorney general
was failing in his duty properly to defend the statute, it was question-
able whether the co-operative were a proper party. Even if petitioner
were a proper party, the decision of the lower court could not be
reversed without a showing that the denial was an abuse of its dis-
cretion. The Court further held that the Declaratory Judgments Act 3
did not require the presence of petitioner, in such action, where public
officers represented it in defending the validity of the statute under
attack. To hold otherwise would necessitate the presence of everyone
who might possibly be affected by the decision, and hence render the
act valueless. White House Milk Co. v. Thomson, 275 Wis. 243, 81
N.W. 2d 725 (1957).
The court expressly declared Muscoda Bridge Co. v. Worden
Allen Co.4 to be determinative of its present decision. The cited case
was an action to enjoin defendants from trespassing on plaintiff's
property during the building of a bridge which was to connect a re-
located state highway between Eagle and Muscoda. Relocation as
planned was to by-pass plaintiff's toll bridge. Petitions for interven-
tion were filed by the state, Richland County, and the towns of Eagle
and Muscoda, all of whom were liable for part payment of the con-
struction cost.5 The Court allowed the intervention of the two former
applicants by reference to sec. 260.19,G but disallowed that of the latter
two. The interest of the state was deemed sufficient in that it was
also a party to the construction contract and to the relocation of the
highway. The additional interest shown by the county was that it was
a party to pending proceedings for condemnation of plaintiff's bridge.
2 Mis. STATS. §260.19 (1955): "(1) When a complete determination of the
controversy in court cannot be had without the presence of other parties, or
when persons not parties have such interests in the subject matter of the con-
troversy as require them to be parties for their protection, the court shall
order them brought in; and when in an action for the recovery of property
a person not a party has an interest therein and makes application to the
court to be made a party it may order him brought in."
3 Wis. STATs. §269.56 (1955): "(11) When declaratory relief is sought, all
persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would
be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the right
of persons not parties to the proceedings .. .
4 196 Wis. 76, 219 N.W. 428 (1928).
5 Under WVss. STATs. §§83.07, 83.08 (1955).
6 See note 2 supra.
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However, the Court held that although the towns displayed "sufficient
interest to make them proper parties,' 7 such interest was amply pro-
tected by reason of the fact that the state and county were made parties.
Schatzman v. Town of Greenfield: Milwaukees was an action by a
resident to enjoin a referendum in proceedings to incorporate a town.
Such proceedings expressly excluded any areas then in various stages
of annexation to the city of Milwaukee. The city attempted to inter-
vene, alleging an interest in its "necessary and proper expansion."
The Court affirmed denial of the application, on the ground that the
city had no direct and immediate interest in the action.9 In this case,
again, we find discussoin of the necssary-or-proper-party test. The
Court concludes its opinion by stating, "None of the alleged interests
of the city constitute it a necessary party to the controversy. . . . We
strongly doubt that it is even a proper party. .... 0
An examination of other Wisconsin decisions shows that where
admission of an intervenor has been sustained, decisions have been
based on two grounds. In the first class of cases, the Court has found,
either expressly or by implication, that the intervenor was an indis-
pensable or a necessary party to the controversy." The second involves
intervention by proper parties, where the Court has refused to disturb
the discretionary action of the trial court.' 2
From these decisions it becomes apparent, then, that in order to
intervene as a matter of right under sec. 260.19, the petitioner for
intervention must be either an indispensable or a necessary party to
the action ;13 that to intervene as a proper party he must show that his
interest would not otherwise be sufficiently protested; and that in the
latter situation the matter rests in the sound discretion of the trial
court.14
As the principal case points out, the Declaratory Judgments Act 1
expressly provides an additional right of intervention. But, as the
court indicates, this provision, too, will be narrowly construed.'6
196 Wis. at 98, 219 N.W. at 437.
8273 Wis. 277, 77 N.W.2d 511 (1955).
9 "There is nothing . . . for the city to defend against, no position for it to
maintain, no city interest which is attacked or which requires or justifies city
presence in the action." Id. at 280, 77 N.W.2d at 513.
10 Id. at 281, 77 N.W.2d at 513.
" See, e.g., Hunt v. Rooney: Coleman, 77 Wis. 258, 45 N.W. 1084 (1890).
12 See, e.g., Weston v. Weston, imp., 46 Wis. 130, 49 N.W. 834 (1879).
13 This is also in accord with Castle v. City of Madison, 113 Wis. 346, 89 N.W.
156 (1902).
14But cf. Davis v. Davis: Davis, 259 Wis. 1, 47 N.W. d 338 (1950) (where
court decided, on the merits, appeal by intervenor, who was wife of defendant,
in suit by former wife against husband to set aside foreign divorce decree)
and Combes v. Keyes, Intervenor, 89 Wis. 297, 62 N.W. 89 (1895) (where
Court allowed one who had once been secretary of a defunct corporation to
intervene in action against the corporation and inform the court of facts
which had worked a dissolution of the corporation).
15 See note 3 supra.
16 See Annot., 169 A.L.R. 851 (1947) on the general topic of the right to inter-
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RECENT DECISIONS
Most jurisdictions which have a code provision of the type relied
upon in the principal case to support the right of intervention do not
regard it as authorizing intervention at all. Rather, they consider it
as providing for the common law practice of bringing in indispensable
or necessary parties, plaintiff or defendant, who have not been joined
by plaintiff's motion, on the court's own initiation, nor upon applica-
tion of the necessary or indispensable party himself.17 Indeed, Wis-
consin, in an earlier decision, 8 has taken a like position, which the
word shall in the statute itself clearly supports. Furthermore, this
state has held that where joinder is optional with the plaintiff, new
parties cannot be brought in under this section.' 9
As the Court says in the White House Milk Co. case, many states
have liberal intervention statutes. These provide substantially that:
"Any person shall be entitled to intervene in an action who
has an interest in the matter in litigation, in the success of either
of the parties, or an interest against both. An intervention takes
place when a third party is permitted to become a party to an
action between other persons, either by joining the plaintiff in
claiming what is sought by the complaint or by uniting with the
defendant in resisting the claims of the plaintiff, or by demand-
ing anything adversely to both the plaintiff and defendant." 20
So also, Rule 24 of the Rules of Procedure for the District Courts
provides for liberal intervention. It is intervention of this type which
was unknown at common law but which was derived from civil law,
coming particularly from the Louisiana Code.2'
It would seem that substantial benefit to the Wisconsin procedure
would result if the provision relied upon in the White House Milk
Co. case were confined to the bringing in of necessary and indispens-
able parties, and either the code intervention provision above-quoted
or the provisions of the federal rule were adopted.
MARY ALICE HOHMANN
Property-Joint Tenancy: Special Aspects as to Joint Bank
Accounts- The co-owners of joint bank accounts are ordinarily said
to hold their interest 'as joint tenants. Two recent Wisconsin cases
vene in suit to determine validity or construction of law or governmental
regulations.
17 CLARK, CODE PLEADING §64 (1928).18 Husting Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 192 Wis. 311, 216 N.W. 833 (1927).
19 Helberg v. Hosmer, 143 Wis. 620, 128 N.W. 439 (1910).
2
0 ALASKA, CoMP. L. §55-3-18 (1949); CAL. CODE OF CIV. PROC. §387 (1949);
IDAHO CODE §5-322 (1948) ; IOWA RULES OF Cxv. PROC., Rules 75, 77 (1950) ;
MINN. STATS. §544.13 (1949); MONT. REv. CODES §93-2826 (1947); NEB. REv.
STAT. §25-328 (1943): NEV. CoMP. L. §8563 (1929); N. D. REv. CODE
§§28-0219, 28-0220 (1943); ORE. ComP. L. §1-316 (1940); S. D. CODE
§33.0413 (1939); WASH. REMINGTON'S REV. CODE §202 (1932).21 Clark, op. cit. supra note 17, at §65.
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